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Abstract
The essay reviews the digital emergency measures many governments have adopted in an attempt to curb Covid-19. It argues 
that those ‘virologically legitimized’ measures may infringe the human right to privacy and mark the transition into a world of 
global surveillance. At this possible turning point in human history, panic and latent fear seem to fog much needed farsight-
edness. Leaving the current state of emotional paralysis and restarting to critically assess the digital pandemic management 
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It is said that the ‘corona crisis’ may be the biggest crisis 
of the current generation. As of 28 September 2020, 32.7 
million persons are said to have been tested positive on 
Sars-CoV-2 in more than 200 countries and territories, and 
991.000 people are said to have died from Covid-19 (WHO 
2020a). On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization’s 
Director General declared Covid-19 as a pandemic (WHO 
2020b). By the end of January and early February 2020, a 
wave of panic of the previously unknown physical Covid-19 
illness has spread across the planet.1
Governmental restrictions and human rights
In an attempt to contain the spread of the corona pandemic, 
and in order for national health care systems not to be over-
whelmed by the potentially enormous influx of people suf-
fering from the acute respiratory syndrome that Sars-CoV-2 
may trigger, many governments have adopted emergency 
measures to secure public health and order.
Those emergency measures are, arguably, drastic. As of 
March 2020, almost the entire globe ‘locked down’:
Most governments have temporarily closed educational 
institutions, impacting 60% of the world’s student popula-
tion. Several other countries have implemented localized 
closures that may impact millions of additional learners 
(UNESCO 2020).2
As a result of the pandemic, around 70 countries across 
the world had imposed or still are imposing entry bans, quar-
antines and other restrictions for citizens or travelers to most 
affected areas (Salcedo and Cherelus 2020). As of 28 Sep-
tember 2020, around 70 countries and territories still impose 
global restrictions applying to all foreign countries, or pre-
vented their citizens from travelling (IATA 2020). Many 
governments had also implemented curfews or urged people 
to stay at and work from home. In places where people were 
still allowed to leave their houses, gatherings of more than a 
handful of people were banned.3 During the lockdowns, in 
many countries, doctors’ offices and pharmacies remained 
open, but restaurants, bars and non-essential shops in the 
majority of places around the globe were ordered to close 
their doors. This threatened the existence of small compa-
nies, with some businesses already declaring insolvency as 
early as March 2020 (Allen 2020), many people becoming 
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unemployed,4 and governments adopting economic support 
measures of unprecedented amounts (European Commission 
2020). Further, especially in low-income countries, health 
access was restricted to almost Covid-19-only cases, disrupt-
ing the prevention and treatment of other noncommunicable 
diseases (WHO 2020c).5
Whereas lockdowns are gradually eased and terminated in 
phases,6 fears of a second virus wave are currently spreading 
again due to surges in the number of confirmed cases in vari-
ous regions. This pushes some countries to consider a retake 
on restrictions7 or even mandating second lockdowns.8
The restrictions affect our human rights. Curfews and 
the ban on gatherings may infringe our freedoms of move-
ment9 and assembly.10 The closing of educational institu-
tions worldwide severely rephrases access to education, a 
right granted by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).11 What is more, the requirement to shift to online-
learning exposes education’s digital divide: in poorer coun-
tries, children may not have the resources required to be 
digitally home-schooled (Thong 2020). Further, many health 
institutions and hospitals have been forced to triage patients 
in case of sudden overloads, which may impede the right 
to access to medical care.12 In addition, the shutting down 
of public life has put jobs and livelihoods into severe jeop-
ardy—possibly affecting our right to work.13
What is more, the listed emergency measures have forced 
a great majority of people to physically isolate and distance 
from loved ones. Millions of people also face economic tur-
moil, because they have lost, or are at risk of losing, income 
and livelihood.14 Misinformation and general unknowingness 
about the virus create deep uncertainty about the future. This 
may probably entail a long-term upsurge in the severity and the 
number of mental health problems (UN 2020). Furthermore, 
first research findings indicate that many children suffer from 
severe psychological stress and the loss of education due to 
the closing of schools.15 Moreover, with unemployed people, 
suicide rates are generally higher, and the quality of life lower 
(Kroll and Lampert 2012). Hence, in attempting to secure pub-
lic physical health, governmental restrictions may well be read 
as potentially putting public mental health into jeopardy.
Global surveillance
Besides restrictions on physical movement that entail the 
above-mentioned potential risks to our freedoms of move-
ment and assembly, our rights to access education and health 
institutions, and our right to work, many governments also 
rely on emerging technologies in their ‘fight’16 against the 
pandemic. Those ‘digital measures’ may severely infringe 
our human right to privacy,17 and may mark the transition 
into a world of surveillance technology.
The adopted emergency measures that engage new tech-
nologies aim primarily at analyzing the spreading pattern of 
the virus and at monitoring and enforcing curfews. Through 
relying on digital strategies, governments follow the World 
Health Organization’s recommendation to trace contacts 
between their citizens (WHO 2020d).
The emergency measures engaging new technologies may 
be roughly divided into five groups18:
Contact tracing apps
Contact tracing apps are designed to support curbing the spread 
of Sars-CoV-2 by tracking individuals and those they have 
come into contact with. Usually, if a person was found to be 
infected, the people she has been recently in contact with are 
informed. Often, they are then asked to self-quarantine. As of 
3 July 2020, roughly 50 countries have been using contact trac-
ing apps in dealing with corona: Australia, Austria, Azerbai-
jan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Bulgaria, Canada (Alberta), 
China (Tangermann 2020), Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Malay-
sia, Mexico, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, 
7 Belgium, e.g., is re-imposing drastic social distancing measures in 
order to avoid a new general lockdown. For Belgium citizens, con-
tacts outside family circles must be limited to the same five people 
over the month of August 2020. See e.g. Van Dorpe and Furlong 
(2020).
8 E.g. California (Somerville 2020) and Victoria in Australia (Picheta 
2020).
9 Art. 13 (1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR), art. 
12 (2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
10 Art. 20 (1) UDHR, art. 21 ICCPR.
11 Art. 26 (1) UDHR.
12 Art. 25 (1) UDHR.
13 Art. 23 (1) UDHR.
14 E.g., between March and May 2020, widespread layoffs and fur-
loughs have prompted about 20% of the US labor force to file for 
unemployment benefits. See e.g. Tappe (2020).
15 However, the findings are not yet peer-reviewed published (Kunkel 
2020).
16 Covid-19 has brought up war rhetoric, see e.g. Goninet (2020).
17 Art. 12 UDHR, art. 17 ICCPR.
18 This section partly relies on research conducted by Woodhams 
(2020).
5 Note, e.g., that, in Germany, the treatment of heart attacks sank by 
up to 40% (Garcia et al. 2020; Slagman et al. 2020).
6 E.g. New Zealand, Spain, Germany, South Korea, India, Iran, Hun-
gary, Singapore, Dubai, Panama, Peru, Thailand (Kaplan et al. 2020).
4 E.g. in Austria, during the lockdown, the total  number of unem-
ployed people rose up to 500.000 (12.2%) within one month, reaching 
its highest level since 1946 (AMS 2020). The EU unemployment rate 
rose up to 7.2%, compared to 7.1% in June, and to a 12-year-low of 
6.8% in March 2020 (Eurostat 2020).
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South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Tuni-
sia, United States of America, United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Vietnam.19 According to 
research conducted by TopVPN.com, about one third of the 
apps rely on GPS technology, a third on Bluetooth, and another 
third use both Bluetooth and GPS (Woodhams 2020).
Digital tracking
Digital tracking includes the use of aggregated mobile loca-
tion data to track citizens during lockdowns, apps designed 
to help identify the location of those with Sars-CoV-2,20 and 
the deployment of advanced mobile monitoring technolo-
gies. As of 3 July 2020, 31 countries around the world have 
adopted digital tracking measures. E.g. government officials 
across the US are relying on location data from millions 
of cellphone users to better understand the movements of 
Americans during the pandemic, and how those movements 
may be affecting the disease (Tau 2020). The British gov-
ernment is working with major mobile network O2 to ana-
lyze its users’ location data (Martin 2020). Other countries 
whose governments retrieve or had retrieved their citizens’ 
geolocation data are Argentina (Davidovsky 2020), Austria 
(Mijnssen 2020), Belgium (Cloot 2020), Brazil (Mari 2020), 
Bulgaria,21 China (Davidson 2020), Ecuador (EcuadorTV 
2020), Finland (Telia 2020), Germany (Reikowski 2020), 
Guatemala (Estrada Tobar 2020) Hong Kong (Hui 2020), 
India (Srivastava and Nagaraj 2020), Iran (Gilbert 2020), 
Israel (Reuters 2020a), Italy (Vodafone 2020), Jordan,22 
Kazakhstan (Gussarova 2020), Morocco (Chahir 2020), New 
Zealand (Andelane 2020), Pakistan (Jahangir 2020), Poland 
(Privacy International 2020), Russia,23 Singapore (Baharu-
din 2020), South Africa (Business Insider SA 2020), South 
Korea (Kim 2020), Spain (GovLab 2020), Switzerland (Reu-
ters 2020b), Taiwan (Chen 2020), and Turkey (HRW 2020a).
Physical surveillance
In order to slow the spread of Covid-19, governments are 
also adopting increasingly extensive physical surveillance 
measures. Those measures include the deployment of facial 
recognition cameras equipped with heat sensors, surveillance 
drones used to monitor citizens’ movements, and extensive 
CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) networks. As of 3 July 
2020, 11 countries have been using physical surveillance 
technologies to address Covid-19. The West Australian police 
force (Spires 2020), the New York Police Department,24 UK 
police forces,25 Belgian police,26 and Madrid’s police force27 
are increasingly relying on the use of aerial footage through 
drones in order to enforce ongoing lockdowns and monitor citi-
zen movements. Since the corona virus outbreak, also Russia 
(Reuters 2020c) and China (Kuo 2020; Shen 2020) are relying 
on a host of extensive surveillance mechanisms, including both 
drones and facial recognition cameras. Other countries using 
physical surveillance are the Bahrain (McArthur 2020), France 
(BBC), India,28 and the United Arab Emirates (Al Monitor 
2020).
Censorship
Since the outbreak of the corona virus, there has been an 
acceleration in the spread of false information (Woodhams 
2020). In order to control and contain mis- and disinforma-
tion, governments have sought to regulate online content and 
promote official facts and figures from international health 
organizations. However, as of 3 July 2020, 18 governments 
have used the rise of mis- and dis-information about Covid-
19 to justify censorship practices that aim at silencing regime 
critics and at controlling the flow of information. E.g. Cam-
bodian (HRW 2020b) and Ugandan (Unwanted Witness 2020) 
authorities have arrested social media platform users that 
spread info about the virus. In Niger (CPJ 2020), authorities 
have arrested a journalist due to his coverage of the virus. 
Egypt (Al Jazeera 2020a) has taken away the press creden-
tials of a British Journalist due to his alleged bad faith in how 
Egypt is dealing with the virus. Iran (Paganini 2020) blocked 
access to the Farsi language edition of Wikipedia due to criti-
cism on how its authorities are handling the pandemic. Fur-
ther countries leveraging the risk of false information about 
corona for censorship purposes are Azerbaijan (RSF 2020c), 
Bangladesh (RSF 2020a), China (Ruan et al. 2020), Hong 
19 A list of contact tracing apps per country can be found in the 
“Appendix”.
20 See e.g. the tracking-app developed with the support of Swiss 
researches at the EPFL in Lausanne, Handelszeitung (2020).
21 See tweet by Dr. Vesselin Bontchev from 24 March 2020: https 
://twitt er.com/VessO nSecu rity/statu s/12425 03942 40951 9106?s=20. 
Accessed 2 April 2020.
22 The Jordanian app ‘Cradar’ is designed to allow citizens to inform 
Jordanian authorities about unauthorized gatherings.
23 See an announcement by the Russian Government ordering the 
Ministry of Communications to develop a new contact tracing system 
to help monitor citizens thought to have come into contact with those 
that have the virus (Russian Government 2020).
24 See the tweet from Spectrum News NY1: https ://twitt er.com/NY1/
statu s/12435 02731 40867 0720. Accessed 2 April 2020.
25 See the tweet from the Derbyshire police: https ://twitt er.com/
Derby sPoli ce/statu s/12431 68931 50388 2241. Accessed 2 April 2020.
26 See the tweet from Raphael-Antonis Stylianou, the EU Commis-
sion’s Online Communications Officer: https ://twitt er.com/Styli anou_
EU/statu s/12414 05641 26624 9728?s=20. Accessed 2 April 2020.
27 See the tweet by BBC World News: https ://twitt er.com/BBCWo 
rld/statu s/12392 67152 54646 7843?s=20. Accessed 2 April 2020.
28 India’s CG Covid-19 ePass requires citizens to register for an elec-
tronic pass to authorize travel. Users have to provide a photograph 
and an ID proof (Aadhar number).
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Kong,29 Japan (Denyer 2020), Kenya (Woodhams 2020), Rus-
sia (RFE 2020), Singapore (Mahtani 2020), Thailand (HRW 
2020c), Turkey (RSF 2020b), Turkmenistan (RSF 2020e), 
Venezuela (Cincurova 2020), and Zimbabwe (RSF 2020d).
Internet shutdowns
During the spread of a novel virus, access to and a free 
flow of reliable and correct information is urgent. Still, the 
governments of Bangladesh (HRW 2019),30 Ethiopia (AFP 
2020a), India (Ganai 2020), and Myanmar (Al Jazeera 
2020b) have restricted internet access some areas of their 
territories.
The description of ongoing monitoring and surveillance 
measures leads to two observations. First, our right to privacy 
may be severely infringed. And second, for the first time in 
human history, technology may make it possible to monitor 
almost everybody, almost everywhere, almost all the time. In 
other words, the corona panic and pandemic may let us slide 
into a world of global surveillance. Most unfortunately, due to 
the level of fear and panic, we seem to accept or even take part 
in those measures without the usual reflex of questioning them.
Potential permanence and inefficacy 
of emergency surveillance measures
In an exceptional situation, states may need additional powers 
to secure public safety and health. National constitutions as 
well as international human rights treaties31 contain clauses 
that allow governments to temporarily suspend some of their 
obligations during a time of crisis. In those situations, gov-
ernments can invoke special powers that would normally be 
considered infringements on human rights, even without for-
mally declaring a state of emergency.32 However, those powers 
are not absolute. Emergency measures must be legal33 and 
proportionate,34 as well as necessary and time-bound. What 
is more, government authorities carry the burden of justifying 
the restrictions (OHCHR 2020).
Restrictions must be necessary for the protection of 
public health. Most importantly, emergency measures can 
qualify as necessary only if they are also efficacious. An 
instrument is efficacious if it produces the intended effect. 
An instrument that is incapable of producing the intended 
effect, is, hence, not efficacious and cannot be necessary for 
achieving that effect. It follows that, in order to determine 
whether surveillance mechanisms can qualify as necessary 
measures, one must determine whether those measures can 
actually provide reliable and useful location information, i.e. 
whether they are efficacious.
Especially measures tapping personal smartphone infor-
mation could not prove fully efficacious. How can cell 
phones be tracked? Cell phone towers are one option, but 
they provide only a very rough measure that is not useful 
to determine whether, e.g. a six-foot-proximity threshold is 
abided by. GPS signals are finer, but they work only outside, 
and can, therefore, not determine whether two people, e.g. 
sat in the same train wagon. What is more, as GPS drains 
battery, many people have it turned off in the first place. A 
WIFI network or Bluetooth beacon to which a smartphone 
is connected is a further location indicator. Still, the fact 
that two cell phones are connected to the same WIFI or 
Bluetooth does not say that they are not keeping a six-foot 
distance (Landau 2020; Stanley et al. 2020). Given that the 
majority of contact tracing apps rely on Bluetooth and GPS, 
those observations raise the question of those apps’ effec-
tiveness and, hence, necessity.
Besides the requirements of legality, proportionality, 
necessity, and non-discrimination, emergency legislation 
must be time-bound.35 Unfortunately, crises have a habit to 
fast-forward certain processes and instruments, whose con-
sequences may not disappear once the crisis is over. Hence, 
the surveillance measures endangering, in particular, our 
human right to privacy may not be terminated once the 
pandemic is successfully contained. Although lockdowns 
are being terminated now, the above-listed apps and digital 
instruments are, largely, still in place. Hence, the require-
ment of time limitation may well be neglected.
35 Peter Micek, Acces Now, Technology and human rights in times 
of crisis, WebDebate, DiploFoundation and Geneva Internet Plat-
form, March 26 2020; OHCHR.
29 See the tweet by Kenneth Roth from 19 March 2020: https ://twitt 
er.com/KenRo th/statu s/12406 71686 25880 2692?s=20. Accessed 2 
April 2020.
30 Since 2019, the Bangladeshi government has shut down internet 
connections in its Rohingya refugee camps (HRW(2019)).
31 Art. 4 (1) ICCPR.
32 While many states have enacted what have been described as 
emergency laws in response to the pandemic, not all of these coun-
tries have actually declared a ‘state of emergency’ under law. Hence, 
governmental behavior is not uniform. E.g., Armenia, Estonia, Geor-
gia, Latvia, Moldova and Romania have declared a state of emer-
gency according to art. 15 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). Other countries in Europe, e.g. Italy and Spain have 
declared states of emergency in accordance with their constitutional 
provisions AFP  (2020b); see also Armstrong (2020). Others, like 
the UK, have introduced what politicians have described as ‘emer-
gency powers.’ The UK government, e.g., convinced parliament to 
pass lengthy legislation allowing extra powers in less than a week, see 
the Coronavirus Act 2020 of 25 March 2020 (UK Parliament 2020).
33 The restriction must be contained in a national law of general 
application. This law must be in force at the time the limitation is 
applied. The law must not be arbitrary, nor unreasonable. Further, it 
must be clear and accessible to the public.
34 The limitation must be somewhat ‘appropriate’ to achieve its pro-
tective function. Further, it must be the least intrusive instrument 
amongst all those that might achieve the desired result.
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Two considerations may support the danger of persisting 
digital surveillance: On the one hand, digital surveillance 
could create financial pay-offs. If anything in the world is 
growing exponentially today, it is the provision of and the 
access to personal data. This may fuel the AI industry and 
could partially support the economic recovery once the virus 
spread is curbed.36 What is more, the ‘digital pandemic 
shock doctrine’ does not only cover virus containment strat-
egies or the monitoring and enforcing of curfews. Forced 
social distancing and isolation, and the shutting down of 
every-day institutions such as schools and workplaces, are a 
breeding ground for technologies that aim at re-installing our 
entire social life in the digital space. Our months-long pan-
demic isolation may well be a lab for a permanent contact-
less future of telehealth, broadband, and remote learning—
highly profitable for businesses developing those services.
On the other hand, surveillance technologies may per-
sist if people spread the perspective of the next crisis being 
‘just around the corner’. The speed of the Covid-19 panic 
wave was enormous, and the paralysis of reflection it created 
severe. Pre-emptive fear may corroborate and consolidate 
national and global surveillance mechanisms, and may make 
us blind to our duty to question them.
Panic and legitimation
The thought driving the rather precipitous governmental 
behavior can be summarized as follows: ‘Any measure nec-
essary to save humanity is legitimate.’37 This clause begs 
the question what the term ‘humanity’ means in this very 
context:
On the one hand side, ‘humanity’ can refer to the ‘human 
species’. In this case, the pressing question is: Could Sars-
CoV-2 extinguish the human species? First estimates of 
Spring 2020 declared a Covid-19 lethality of approximately 
10% (EBM 2020). Meanwhile, those figures have been 
proved wrong. Today, experts estimate a so-called ‘Infection 
fatality rate’38 of between 0.27 and 0.36% (Ioannidis 2020; 
Streeck et al. 2020).39 This estimate is considerably lower 
and draws a much less fatalistic picture of the pandemic. 
However, it must be noted that, as of today, there still exists 
only very little robust medical evidence on Covid-19, and 
further studies are necessary (EBM 2020).
In order to understand the spreading pattern of the virus, 
many countries are currently also conducting population-
wide-testing.40 The most common way of testing for Covid-
19 is the so-called PCR-test. In some countries both people 
who do show as well as people who do not show clinical 
signs of SARS-CoV-19 are tested.41 This sort of indiscrimi-
nate testing, however, may lead to excessive diagnostic. Fur-
thermore, as of today, there exist no published and medically 
usable studies on the accuracy of the PCR-test.42 Moreover, 
and most interestingly, whereas the numbers of persons 
tested positive are currently on the rise in certain countries, 
those states’ number of hospitalized patients requiring inten-
sive care remains relatively static (EBM 2020). Hence, not 
only is there only little robust medical evidence on Covid-
19, but the informative value of the test results may not be 
fully reliable.
Those observations allow the assumption that ‘humanity’, 
understood as the human species, may, most probably, not be 
at risk of extinction by Covid-19. The clause ‘any measure 
necessary to save humanity’ may, hence, not legitimize the 
rush into both digital and non-digital governmental emer-
gency measures against the current pandemic.
On the other hand, ‘humanity’ may also refer to what 
may slumber within each individual person. The protection 
of this very seed of humanity is the task of human rights; 
and the protection of human rights is the primary task of 
states. Hence, if ‘humanity’ is understood in this way, the 
justification for governmental emergency measures may be 
even more fragile. For, as has been shown, many of those 
measures, amongst them increased surveillance, may violate 
certain fundamental human rights. Thus, if ‘humanity’ is 
understood as each individual human’s value and potential, 
one could say that it is, currently, at risk—not primarily by 
Covid-19, but by certain governmental emergency measures.
Though it seems improbable that Covid-19 may extin-
guish the human race, the initial global panic does not seem 
36 The tech giants Amazon, Alphabet, Apple and Facebook are 
already recording quarterly profit (Lopatto 2020).
37 In addressing the pandemic, ‘saving humanity’ is one of the most 
prominent rhetorical references of the planet’s most powerful leaders, 
see e.g. the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Economictimes 
2020).
38 The ‘Infection fatality rate’ also considers less severe, asympto-
matic courses of the disease, whereas the ‘lethality rate’ was based 
on the simple division of the number of fatalities by the number of 
proven illnesses (EBM 2020).
39 However, it must be noted that those studies are preprints and did 
not undergo a formal peer-review process yet.
40 This testing scheme is sometimes also called ‘mass testing’. For an 
overview of mass testing strategies in the EU / EEA and the UK, see, 
e.g., ECDC (2020). E.g., Germany tested almost 900.000 in calender 
week 33 (875.524), Austria 63.000 and Switzerland 73.000. The rate 
of individuals found positive lies at 1% in Germany (RKI 2020), 2% 
in Austria (BM Österreich), and 3% in Switzerland (Schweizerische 
Eidgenossenschaft BAG 2020b).
41 E.g. in Germany (EBM 2020).
42 The PCR-test is a molecular diagnostic test that detects the Corona 
virus’ genetic material, see e.g. FDA (2020).
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to fade, but rather to be replaced by a latent and passive fear-
fulness. One important reason may be that the current risk 
communication is not based on the medical evidence that 
would draw a less fatalistic picture. On the one hand side, 
governmental measures themselves may instill and aggra-
vate fear. As, for many citizens of the globe, the extent and 
the severity of those interventions are largely unprecedented 
and, thus, themselves a great shock. On the other hand, also 
media coverage seems to corroborate the global state of fear. 
In German-speaking countries, e.g. public reporting does not 
consistently differentiate between people tested positive on 
Covid-19, and those who have fallen ill. This differentiation 
is especially crucial in countries where the rising number 
of people who are tested positive is not accompanied by a 
parallel increase in hospitalizations and intensive care treat-
ments.43 Furthermore, SARS-CoV-2 incidents are very often 
reported as absolute numbers without reference figures, and 
the total numbers are published cumulatively. This contra-
dicts the basic principles for presenting epidemiological data 
(EBM 2020). This sort of pandemic coverage can be strongly 
misleading and fuel both individual and societal fear.
If one accepts a civilian duty to reflect upon whether gov-
ernment measures could infringe human rights, the global 
state of excessive emotionality, or the gradual slide into a 
latent passivity, must again be replaced by a state of rea-
son—especially given emergency surveillance’s potential 
permanence. Put differently, not only the pandemic, but 
also the panic must stop. If not, humans will be incapable 
to reasonably reflect on whether, and if so, how, to opt out 
of the path fear has been pushing them on to. What is more, 
the emerging picture of wide-spread mental health issues 
due to the demanded isolation and panic may now require 
an even stronger effort to reclaim both people’s individual 
willingness as well as their capacity for clear-sightedness.
The responsibility lies with every individual. Any insti-
tution is only as strong as the reflected minds of its mem-
bers and the reflected minds of the population it aims to 
represent. This conclusion must, first and foremost, guide 
media professionals. Their responsibility to curb fear and 
provide well-balanced facts in order to push global society 
back to reason is enormous. Second, any governmental anti-
pandemic decision must be appropriately accompanied by 
science and, wherever already possible, scientifically sub-
stantiated. Only then is it possible to properly document the 
ratio between the benefit that those measures bring to public 
health, and the societal costs they entail. Finally, this conclu-
sion must guide anyone whose primary needs are currently 
still met. If humanity wants to move into a balanced future, 
humans must both reconquer and use their individual reflec-
tive capacity, which requires time and quietness. This may 
have been one profound advantage of the demand to stay at 
home, as both were, or still are, more easily accessible. We 
must regard our more isolated and socially cautious lives 
as an invitation for introspection, for an increased level of 
self-understanding, and for a new prioritization of values.
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